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In mid-1998, a World Bank study grimly noted that "Indonesia is in deep economic 
crisis. A country that achieved decades of rapid growth, stability, and poverty 
reduction is now near economic collapse . . .  no country in recent history, let alone one 
the size of Indonesia, has ever suffered such a dramatic reversal of fortune."1 2 There is 
bitter irony in Indonesia's fall from grace. Long hailed as a model of successful 
economic development, it was widely predicted to escape the fate of Thailand.3 
Between June-August 1997, as Thailand's economy unraveled and the virulent Asian 
flu sent shock waves through the region, the Indonesian economy remained relatively 
stable—a veritable rock in the stormy sea. Even the World Bank remained upbeat 
about the short-term outlook, believing that a widening of the intervention band would 
be sufficient to ward off contagion.4 The Indonesian government, which received much 
praise for its swift and decisive response to the crisis, went to great lengths to assure 
jittery investors "that Indonesia was not Thailand." Then the unthinkable happened.
1 The author would like to thank Bank Indonesia officials in Jakarta for providing valuable data used in 
this paper and an anonymous reviewer of this journal for insightful comments on an earlier draft of this 
paper. The author is responsible for any remaining errors.
2 World Bank, Indonesia in Crisis: A Macroeconomic Update (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1998) p. 1.
3 Furman and Stiglitz find that Indonesia's crisis was the least predictable within a sample of thirty-four 
troubled countries. See Jason Furman and Joseph Stiglitz, "Economic Crises: Evidence and Insights from 
East Asia," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2 (1998): 1-135.
4 World Bank, Indonesia: Sustaining High Growth with Equity (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1997).
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Indonesia suddenly succumbed to the contagion, and, measured by the magnitude of 
currency depreciation and contraction of economic activity, it emerged as the most 
serious casualty of Asia's financial crisis.5
What happened? Why did Indonesia (and the other high-performing Asian 
economies) collapse like hollow dominoes? In the numerous post-mortems that have 
followed, analysts have identified a number of related factors behind the region's 
dramatic reversal of fortune. In the case of Indonesia, the variable that soon acquired 
particular salience was "crony capitalism." Initially popularized by the Economist,6 
the term quickly took a life of its own. Soon thereafter, the distinguished MIT 
economist, Paul Krugman, would argue that crony capitalism lay the root of 
Indonesia's—and indeed, East Asia's—financial woes. Krugman describes the inner- 
workings and manifestations of the insidious crony capitalism in evocative prose.
. . . how Asia fell apart is pretty familiar . . . the region's downfall was a 
punishment for its sins. We all know now what we should have known even 
during the boom years: that there was a dark underside to "Asian values," that 
the success of too many Asian businessman depended less on what they knew 
than on whom they knew. Crony capitalism meant, in particular, that dubious 
investments—unneeded office blocks outside Bangkok, ego-driven diversification 
by South Korean chaebol—were cheerfully funded by local banks, as long as the 
borrower had the right government connections. Sooner or later there had to be a 
reckoning.7
Krugman's emphasis on crony capitalism, while not without merit, is too simplistic. 
After all korupsi, kolusi, and dan nepotisme (corruption, collusion and nepotism) have 
long been pervasive in Indonesia.8 It was hardly an obstacle when Indonesia notched 
up impressive economic growth rates for some three decades prior to the crisis. Back 
then, crony capitalism was politely referred to as the "government-private sector 
nexus" and viewed as a unique feature of the East Asian "developmental states" and 
even a necessary prerequisite for development. Rather, this essay argues that a more 
nuanced understanding of Indonesia's economic crisis can be gained by differentiating 
between the "sources of vulnerability" and the "precipitating" factors. A careful 
review of the events leading to the crisis shows that both these factors converged 
during the critical period between late August 1997 and March 1998—and practically 
everything that could go wrong did over these months. The greatest source of 
vulnerability—indeed, the fundamental weakness—lay in Indonesia's over-guaranteed, 
but under-capitalized and under-regulated, banking sector. The precipitating factors 
were the contagion, but more importantly, poor macroeconomic management by the 
Suharto regime, and, to a lesser extent, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
exacerbated the crisis.
5 An estimated contraction of 15 percent in output occurred in 1998. This figure is among the most dramatic 
economic collapses recorded since the Great Depression.
6 "Economics Focus: Why Did Asia Crash?/' Economist, January 10-16,1998, p. 11.
7 Paul Krugman, "Saving Asia: Its Time to Get Radical," Fortune, September 7,1998, p. 17.
8 See, Dwight King, "Corruption in Indonesia: A Curable Cancer," Journal o f International Affairs 53,2 
(Spring 2000): 603-624; and Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 2000).
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The Background
The fact that nobody predicted Indonesia's impending collapse is hardly 
surprising. Hill notes that before the crisis "almost every technical economic indicator 
looked safe."9 Indeed, for a country that was dismissed during the 1950s as a "chronic 
dropout" and one that "must surely be accounted the number one failure among the 
major underdeveloped countries," Indonesia's economic development prior to the crisis 
was nothing short of miraculous.10 Economic growth averaged 7 percent between 1970 
and 1989 and 8 percent between 1990 and 1996. This growth occurred alongside 
substantial industrialization and structural change, as agriculture's share of GDP 
(Gross Domestic Product) declined from 55 percent in 1965 to 19.4 percent in 1990, 
while the share of manufactures in GDP rose from 8 percent to 20 percent by 1990.11 
By 1993, manufactured exports reached US$21 billion and accounted for 53 percent of 
total exports.12 Moreover, by the late 1980s, the economy had become more trade- 
dependent, with total trade flows as a percentage of GDP rising sharply from 14 
percent in 1965 to 54.7 percent in 1990. These developments increased the capacity of 
the economy to mobilize savings, as reflected in the rise of national savings as a 
percentage of GDP from 7.9 percent in 1965 to 26.3 percent in 1990.13 Equally 
impressive, the quality of life for the average Indonesian improved greatly, as per 
capita income rose from US$75 in 1966 to US$1,200 in 1996. These gains were spread 
fairly equitably. For example, between 1976 and 1990 income per person in the poorest 
quintile of Indonesia's population grew by 5.8 percent per year, whereas the average 
income of the entire population grew by 4.9 percent per year. To put this success in 
some comparative context: in 1967 per capita income in Indonesia was less than one- 
half that of India, Nigeria, or Bangladesh. By mid-1997, it was five times that of 
Bangladesh, four times that of Nigeria, and three and a half times that of India.14 With 
such growth, the proportion of population living below the official poverty line 
declined from 64 percent to an estimated 11 percent between 1970 and 1996—one of 
the largest reductions in poverty recorded anywhere in the world during the period. 
Other socioeconomic indicators bear out this success. Infant mortality declined from 
145 per 1,000 live births in 1970 to 53 per 1,000 in 1995, life expectancy rose from 46 
to 63 years during the same period, and the country achieved universal primary 
education in 1995. While Java—in particular, greater Jakarta—was the major 
beneficiary, the benefits of economic growth extended to all of Indonesia's twenty-
9 Hal Hill, The Indonesian Economy in Crisis: Causes, Consequences and Lessons (Singapore: The Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1999), p. 8.
10 Quotes are cited in Hal Hill, The Indonesian Economy Since 1966 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), p. 1.
11 K. S. Jomo, Southeast Asia's Misunderstood Miracle: Industrial Policy and Economic Development in 
Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), p. 133.
12 World Bank. World Development Report: 1996 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 216.
13 Jomo, Southeast Asia's Misunderstood Miracle, p. 133.
14 Lloyd Kenward, "Assessing Vulnerability to Financial Crisis: Evidence from Indonesia," Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Studies 35,3 (1999): 71-95.
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seven culturally diverse and far-flung provinces.15 Mills sums up Indonesia's 
achievements in these words:
Indonesia's growth rate over the past twenty-five years has transformed a 
desperately poor society in which malnutrition, illiteracy and infant mortality 
were widespread into one with a large middle class, one in which nearly all 
children are educated and in which infant mortality and malnutrition have 
decreased dramatically. The benefits of such relatively rapid growth are not 
shared equally in any society, but all major groups benefitted greatly: farmers, 
factory workers, industrialists, small business owners, government employees 
and the urban poor.16
One of the repeated boasts of the Suharto regime was that it had defeated the 
rampant hyper-inflation of the Sukarno era, and that it had managed to keep budget 
deficits low and in balance.17 Indeed, prudent macroeconomic management kept the 
budget broadly balanced for an unprecedented thirty years—or the entire length of the 
Suharto era. Again, it was effective economic management that helped Indonesia steer 
through the difficulties of the steep oil price increases and declines in the 1970s and 
1980s, and that kept the macro-economy largely in balance right up to the onset of the 
crisis in mid-1997. As noted earlier, the government essentially proscribed domestic 
financing for the budget, a strategy that kept both expenditures and monetary growth 
under relative control. Since the mid-1980s, inflation was kept within single digits, and 
on the eve of the crisis was about 6 percent.18 Compared to deficits in Thailand and 
Malaysia, Indonesia's current account deficit in the 1990s averaged only 2.6 percent of 
GDP. In fact, not once in any year between 1990 and 1996 did its annual current 
account deficits ever exceed the average over the period 1983-89. Thus, the deficit on 
the current account of the balance of payments looked manageable. Also, unlike in 
Thailand, there was no serious exchange rate misalignment, as Indonesia's exchange 
rate policy was gradually being relaxed (via widening of the intervention band) by 
Bank Indonesia, the country's central bank. Moreover, international reserves, both in 
absolute terms and in months of merchandise imports, were comfortable and rising; the 
external debt to GDP ratio was gradually declining and was appreciably lower than 
during the difficult adjustment period of the mid-1980s. And, with the exception of 
1990, Indonesia had an excess of private savings over investment in the period 1990- 
96. The budget surplus averaged over 1 percent in the four years previous to the crisis,
15 See Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, and World Bank, Indonesia in Crisis, p. 75.
16 Edwin Mills, Growth and Equity in the Indonesian Economy (Washington, D.C.: The United States- 
Indonesia Society, 1995), Background paper, no. I, p. 7.
17 Hollinger writes that "in the early years of the Soeharto administration a new foundation for fiscal 
policy was put into place: the so-called 'balanced budget principle' which was enacted into law. This still 
remains today as the guiding rule on the budget and is embodied in each year's annual budget law as passed 
by parliament. 'Balanced' has a specific meaning in the Indonesian policy context. The requirement is that 
the total of government expenditures, including both the 'routine' expenditures and the 'development' 
expenditures into which the Indonesian budget is divided, cannot exceed the total of tax revenues collected 
domestically plus official foreign aid." William Hollinger, Economic Policy under President Soeharto: 
Indonesia's Twenty-Five Year Record (Washington, DC: The United States-Indonesia Society, 1996), p. 20.
18 Ross McLeod, "Indonesia's Crisis and Future Prospects," in Asian Contagion: The Causes and 
Consequences of a Financial Crisis, ed. Karl D. Jackson (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), p. 209.
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and credit growth was modest.19 In short, the traditional economic fundamentals 
looked sound.
Sources of Vulnerability
With such an enviable record of development and seemingly sound fundamentals, 
what went wrong? The roots of the crisis can be traced back to the mid-1980s, when 
Indonesia embarked on an ambitious economic reform program. The reforms were 
designed to diversify the economy in order to reduce its dependence on the oil sector, 
encourage the development of a competitive non-oil export oriented industrial base 
that would absorb the rapidly growing labor force, and expand the role of the private 
sector, including foreign capital. Key elements of the reform measures between 1985- 
1996 included: (a) gradual liberalization of direct investment inflows to promote non­
oil exports and economic diversification; (b) maintenance of a competitive exchange 
rate; (c) trade liberalization and tariff reform; (d) improvements in monetary 
management; (e) financial sector reform through liberalization of external inflows; (f) 
the promotion of competition in the banking sector; and (h) encouraging the growth of 
the capital market by extending the role of the market in raising funds for investments 
and lengthening the maturity of money-market instruments. Further, in 1989 the 
authorities liberalized portfolio capital inflows by eliminating quantitative limits on 
banks' borrowing from nonresidents. Foreigners were allowed to own up to 49 percent 
of the shares issued by listed domestic companies (except banks), while domestic 
companies were allowed to raise funds by selling securities in local and international 
stock and bond markets. In 1990, restrictions on direct investments inflows were 
further relaxed, and foreign direct investors were allowed to sell foreign exchange 
directly to commercial banks instead of through the central bank, and to purchase 
securities on the stock market and on the over-the-counter bourse. However, as the 
following sections will show, rapid liberalization implemented without putting the 
necessary prudential regulations in place, combined with haphazard implementation 
of the reform measures, made Indonesia highly vulnerable to economic shocks.
Indonesia's seemingly endless growth potential and its adoption of market-friendly 
economic policies attracted foreign investors. Capital inflows increased almost two 
and one-half times from 1990-94, reaching US$14.7 billion.20 Overall, between 1990- 
96, Indonesia experienced a surge in capital inflows averaging about 4 percent of GDP. 
Although not as large as the inflows received by Thailand (10 percent of GDP) and 
Malaysia (9 percent of GDP), cumulatively it still represented a large volume of capital 
for the economy effectively to absorb. Indeed, by mid-1997, Indonesia's total debt 
outstanding to foreign commercial banks amounted to US$59 billion.21 What made 
Indonesia particularly vulnerable was the maturity structure of the foreign borrowing. 
According to the Indonesian government's own figures, by the end of June 1997, out of
19 World Bank, Indonesia: Sustaining High Growth with Equity.
20 Anwar Nasution, "The Financial Crisis in Indonesia," in East Asia's Financial System: Evolution and 
Crisis, ed. Seiichi Masuyama, Donna Vandenbrink, and Chia Siow Yue (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 1999), p. 76.
21 Steven Radelet, "Indonesia: Long Road to Recovery," unpublished paper, Harvard Institute for 
International Development (March 1999), p. 3.
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the US$140 billion (about 60 percent of GDP) in external debt, approximately US$33 
billion was short-term debt with maturities due within one year.22 In addition to this 
amount, Indonesian firms also took out large lines of short-term credit in foreign 
currencies both directly from foreign lenders and from Indonesian banks—greatly 
adding to their foreign currency exposure. By contrast, foreign exchange reserves in 
mid-1997 stood at about US$20 billion. In other words, short-term debts owed to 
foreign commercial banks were about 1.75 times the size of Indonesia's total foreign 
exchange reserves.23
The massive inflow of short-term capital was no accident. Indonesia's exchange 
rate system made short-term debt particularly attractive. From the mid-1980s until 
August 14,1997, the Indonesian government maintained an intervention band system 
(the so-called "crawling peg regime") under which the government pledged to intervene 
in the markets through means such as foreign exchange purchases and interest rate 
adjustments—if the rupiah depreciated or appreciated against the US dollar beyond a 
set percentage. The authorities typically targeted the nominal depreciation of the 
rupiah against the dollar at between 3-5 percent per annum. There was little variation 
in this, as Bank Indonesia intervened in the foreign exchange market by buying and 
selling the rupiah in an intervention band around the central rate. The reasoning behind 
such an activist policy was to stabilize the real exchange rate, thereby discouraging 
speculative capital inflows and giving monetary authorities greater flexibility to control 
monetary aggregates. However, the predictability of the exchange rate made short-term 
dollar loans seem less risky, and therefore much more attractive. For example, an 
Indonesian bank borrowing in US dollars simply could compare the cost of purchasing 
a hedging instrument with the maximum depreciation of the rupiah against the US 
dollar permitted under the intervention band during the term of the loan. Thus, hedging 
the currency exposure only would be economically justified when the cost of the 
hedging instrument was less than the maximum potential depreciation of the rupiah 
under the intervention band system. Because short-term funding on an unhedged basis 
was so attractive, and because borrowers were led to believe that the expected losses 
from currency depreciation would be less than the cost of hedging foreign borrowings, 
the majority of the banking sector's foreign borrowing remained unhedged. As Radelet 
notes, "this predictability [of the exchange rate] also undercut the incentives for firms 
to hedge against their exposure to exchange rate movements. According to one 
estimate, hedging added about 6 percentage points to the cost of borrowing. Very few 
firms covered their exposure."24 This mis-pricing of foreign credits, combined with the 
increased supply of funds in the global financial markets, contributed to very large 
capital inflows and created vulnerability for firms with substantial foreign exchange 
exposure.
In addition, domestic firms found short-term foreign currency loans appealing since 
they carried relatively lower interest rates. In fact, firms assumed that they would be 
able easily to roll over their loans when they fell due—after all, this is what they had 
done for several years before the crisis. Radelet aptly notes that Indonesia's
22 IMF. "Letter of Intent: Indonesia—Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies," (1997) accessed on 
June 10, 2000: http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/103197.HTM
23 Radelet, "Indonesia: Long Road to Recovery," p. 3.
24 Radelet, "Indonesia: Long Road to Recovery," pp. 3-4.
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vulnerability was all the greater because its largest creditors were Japanese banks, 
which provided about 40 percent of the total credit from foreign banks.25 The 
underlying weaknesses of Japanese banks made them more likely to try to pull their 
loans quickly once the crisis began. Indeed, this is precisely what happened. In mid- 
August 1997, as Thailand reached agreement with the IMF on its first program, 
Japanese banks agreed to keep US$19 billion in trade and other credit facilities open 
for certain Thai commercial bank borrowers. Not wanting to be caught again in similar 
situations in other countries in the region, the Japanese banks began to withdraw their 
credits from Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea and other countries—helping to further spread 
the crisis.
Indonesia's crawling peg regime unintentionally contributed to another problem: a 
modestly overvalued exchange rate and slowing export growth. This trend sharply 
increased after the 1987 Plaza Accord, which brought down the value of the US dollar 
and ushered in a new era of the appreciating yen. Between 1985 and 1988, the yen 
almost doubled in value vis-a-vis the dollar and other Asian currencies tied to the 
dollar. More broadly, by 1988, the yen was almost 30 percent above its average for the 
1980-85 period on an inflation-adjusted, trade-weighted basis.26 By the mid 1990s, 
the era of the strong yen was over, as indicated by the sharp appreciation of the dollar 
in 1995, especially its appreciation vis-a-vis the yen. As the dollar rose relative to the 
yen, the currencies of the countries tied to the dollar (like Indonesia) rose in 
comparison with the yen also.27 Radelet notes that between 1990 and mid-1997, the 
rupiah appreciated approximately 22 percent in real terms, while growth in 
Indonesia's non-oil exports slowed from an annual average of 26 percent in 1991-92 to 
14 percent between 1993-95 to just 10 percent in 1996-97.28 This modest overvaluation 
and export slowdown, although smaller than in the other crisis-affected countries, 
clearly pointed toward the need for some moderate adjustments to reestablish the 
international competitiveness of Indonesian firms.
Vulnerability also resulted from the way the capital inflows were utilized. The 
massive capital inflows soon created problems of absorption. While capital was 
invested in productive investments such as infrastructure development, electricity 
generation, and heavy industries such as petrochemicals and automobile assembly, a 
significant portion also found its way into the non-tradeable sector—in particular, real 
estate—fueling speculative overbuilding, particularly in the greater Jakarta area.29 Why 
real estate? The surge in private capital inflows relative to the size of the equity market 
quickly drove equity prices up. Investments in real estate—especially, housing, hotels 
and tourist resorts, amusement parks, golf courses, and shopping malls—looked
25 Radelet, "Indonesia: Long Road to Recovery," p. 4.
26 Takatoshi Ito and Tokuo Iwaisako, "Explaining Asset Bubbles in Japan," Monetary and Economic 
Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 14, no. 1 (July 1996), pp. 143-93.
27 After hitting a historical high of eighty yen to the dollar in June 1995, the yen experienced a downward 
trend, falling to 127 yen to the dollar in April 1997—or just before the Asian crisis broke. The yen's sharp 
depreciation led to a marked deterioration in East and Southeast Asia's export performance and current 
account imbalances in 1996, paving the way for the currency crisis.
28 Radelet, "Indonesia: Long Road to Recovery," p. 4.
29 H. Sender, "Space Race: Jakarta's Real Estate Market Headed for Trouble?,'' Far Eastern Economic 
Revieiv, August 4,1994, pp. 55-56.
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promising. Foreign lenders able to purchase stock, commercial paper, and real estate 
easily were only too eager to finance these projects, not only because they seemed to be 
good investments, but also because many of these projects were controlled either 
directly or indirectly by Suharto's family and their cronies; they assumed that the 
projects carried an implicit guarantee from the Indonesian government.
Perhaps Indonesia's greatest vulnerability lay in its weak financial system, 
especially its dangerously undercapitalized and poorly supervised banks. What 
explains this weakness and why was it allowed to persist? A brief background is 
necessary. While reform of the Indonesian banking system was initiated in 1983 with 
the abolishment of Bank Indonesia's control over interest rates on deposits and loans, 
it was in October 1988 that Bank Indonesia enacted a package of major banking 
reforms known as PATKO '88.30 Among other things, PATKO '88 ended segmentation 
of the financial market, improved market competition, and relaxed the restrictions on 
the establishment of private and foreign-owned banks, as well as those restrictions on 
existing banks opening new branches—including the granting of permission to state- 
owned firms to deposit 50 percent of their short-term funds with private banks, 
instead of only with state-owned banks. Moreover, it permitted extremely low 
capitalization, setting the minimum paid-in capital requirement for newly established 
banks at the rupiah equivalent of US$5 million. It also allowed more foreign ownership 
of domestic assets, abolished the limits on inflow of foreign direct investment and 
foreign ownership of equities issued in domestic stock markets, and sharply eased 
bank reserve requirements from 15 percent to 2 percent. Further deregulation in 1989 
eliminated the need for Bank Indonesia approval for medium and long-term loans and 
removed ceilings on offshore loans.31 In addition, the government moved to deregulate 
equity, bond, insurance, and related financial activities. Not surprisingly, by the end of 
1996, commercial banks dominated the financial system in Indonesia. Out of a total of 
238 commercial banks, there were seven state-owned banks, twenty-seven regional 
government banks, 160 private banks, thirty-four joint-venture banks, and ten foreign 
banks. In addition, there were approximately 9,200 rural banks. Nonbank financial 
institutions included 252 finance companies, 163 insurance companies, about three 
hundred pension and provident funds, and thirty-nine mutual fund companies. Total 
assets of the system were equivalent to about 90 percent of GDP. Commercial banks 
held 84 percent of total assets, while rural banks held about 2 percent. The remaining 
assets were held by finance companies (7 percent of total assets), insurance companies 
(5 percent), and other nonbank financial institutions held 2 percent.32
30 The 1983 reforms were enacted at a time when Indonesia's earnings from oil (its principal export 
commodity) were declining. In the two-year period, 1982-83, Indonesia's export earnings from oil fell by 24 
percent. The Indonesian government recognized that a more efficient and well-developed banking system 
would help foster the creation of a more diversified national economy. For details, see Michael Bennett, 
"Banking Deregulation In Indonesia," University of Pennsylvania Journal o f International Business Laiv 
16,443 (1995).
31 John Montgomery, "The Indonesian Financial System: Its Contribution to Economic Performance and Key 
Policy Issues," IMF Working Paper, WP/97/45 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1997),
pp. 11-12.
32 Carl-Johan Lindgren, Tomas Balino, Charles Enoch, Anne-Marie Guide, Marc Quintyn and Leslie Teo, 
Financial Sector Crisis and Restructuring: Lessons from Asia, IMF Occasional Paper 188 (Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund, 1999), p. 13.
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While these reforms succeeded in transforming a closed banking sector dominated 
by a small number of state-owned banks into a more diverse and competitive system, 
and they brought benefits to the economy—such as more efficient credit allocation and 
financial intermediation (not to mention providing Indonesians with many more 
options for financial services)—banking deregulation also posed challenges that the 
authorities failed to meet. First, the problem of moral hazard occasioned by explicit or 
implicit government guarantees induced reckless lending, especially to the well- 
connected. Indeed, there was a strong presumption in the financial and business 
community that neither investors nor lenders would ever bear the full cost of any 
corporate or bank failure. This belief was fostered by the close links between powerful 
business groups, who also often controlled financial institutions, and the government. 
Investors and bankers were led to assume that the government would eventually bail 
them out if they got into trouble, even in the absence of explicit government guarantees. 
As Krugman observes, when government actions suggest that there is an explicit 
guarantee against either bank or corporate failure, such implicit guarantees can trigger 
asset price inflation and make the financial system vulnerable to collapse.33 And, 
second, the failure simultaneously to develop the necessary prudential supervisory, 
regulatory, and legal framework (and enforce what regulation did exist) made 
Indonesia highly susceptible to a system-wide banking crisis.
For example, the financial reforms resulted in a rapid expansion of bank credit—a 
variable widely regarded in financial markets as an indicator of financial vulnerability, 
since high credit/GDP ratios weaken the capacity of central banks to push up interest 
rates in defense of the currency during a crisis. Outstanding bank credit increased by 
an average of 24.3 percent per year from 1992 to 1996. Part of the credit expansion 
was financed by foreign borrowing, and when restrictions on lending were lifted, banks 
began to expand and extend credit to property and real estate, including ambitious 
and costly infrastructure projects. Bank Indonesia's own figures show that bank 
lending to the property and real estate sector increased by roughly 40 percent from 
1995 to 1996.34 While the competitive, if not speculative, market environment (not to 
mention the easy availability of bank credit) increased the pressure on banks to lend 
without careful risk-assessment, Nasution notes that "Indonesia's prudential rules and 
regulations were poorly implemented and largely unenforced . .  . bank credit officers 
who were reared in the pre-reform environment may have lacked the expertise to 
evaluate new sources of credit and market risk."35
Furthermore, officials at the state-owned banks, who viewed their job security and 
career advancement as being essentially dependent on their ability to satisfy powerful 
individuals and the well-connected, hardly bothered to assess the creditworthiness of 
the borrowers. Not surprisingly, in the case of the state-owned banks, risky lending 
practices were often the result of both explicit and implicit pressure exerted by 
members of the Suharto family, their cronies, and other high ranking military and 
government officials, to make loans to favored borrowers. Indeed, the practice of 
making loans based on political pressure became known as "memo lending" because
33 Krugman, "Saving Asia."
34 Soedradjad Djiwandono, The Banking Industry Facing the 21 Century, Bank of Indonesia (1999),
(http: / / www.bi.go.id / inti /speeches /century .htm)
35 Nasution, "The Financial Crisis in Indonesia," p. 80.
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such loans were extended on the basis of a "memo" sent by the powerful and well- 
connected. Soon memo lending and other illegal practices led to high levels of non­
performing loans at the state-owned banks. lire case of a government-owned 
development bank, Bank Pembangunan Indonesia (also known by its acronym as Bank 
Bapindo), is illustrative. In 1994, Bank Bapindo lent some US$430 million to the 
Golden Key group, at that time a little known Indonesian conglomerate owned by a 
businessman Eddy Tansil, with close links with senior military and government 
officials. The loan was never repaid, and later government investigation alleged that 
the loan had been extended based on fraudulent documentation and with the 
complicity of key Bapindo executives and government officials, including former 
minister of finance, Johannes Sumarlin.36 Regulators and central bank supervisors were 
also involved in fraud and collusion. For example, in the case of commercial paper 
issued by PT Bank Pacific, PT Bank Arta Prima, and PT Bank Perniagaan, four 
supervisors of Bank Indonesia were arrested in early August 1997 for allegedly taking 
bribes during inspections between 1993 and 1996. Nasution provides a macro 
dimension of the problem:
Despite average annual economic growth of over 6 percent since 1990, the volume 
of problem loans held by Indonesia's banks remained considerable. In 1995, 8.8 
percent of total bank credit outstanding was classified as sub-standard, 
doubtful, or bad debt. As of November 1996, the bad debt of the banking system 
amounted to Rp.[rupiah] 10.4 trillion (equivalent to about 2 percent of GDP or 
around 10 percent of total loans). Of this amount, state-owned banks held Rp. 
7.1 trillion (68 percent).37
In the case of the private banks, risky lending practices usually involved banks 
making loans to affiliated companies—which also included affiliated property 
companies. Specifically, since liberalization increased the attraction of commercial and 
industrial concerns to the financial sector, many of Indonesia's large business 
conglomerates opened one or more private banks. Most of these banks were not 
managed on an independent basis, but as funding sources for the affiliated businesses; 
they extended loans to suit the funding needs of the businesses, following terms that 
were dictated by the affiliated businesses' senior office-holders, rather than being 
based on diligent risk-assessment of the companies' creditworthiness. While there were 
rules regarding the aggregate amount that a bank could lend to its affiliated companies, 
there were no clear provisions to enforce the rules. In any case, indirect or intra-group 
lending could be easily concealed. Thus, loans to affiliated companies were among the 
riskiest loans held by the private banks. The case of Bank Summa is illustrative. This 
bank was one of the first private banks established after the enactment by Bank 
Indonesia of the 1988 banking reforms. Prior to its collapse, Bank Summa was one of 
the ten largest banks in Indonesia and was owned by the influential Soeryadjaya 
family, who also had major controlling interest in Astra International, one of 
Indonesia's largest conglomerates. In 1992, Bank Summa collapsed. At the time of 
Bank Summa's liquidation, it was estimated that more than 70 percent of its loan 
portfolio was nonperforming, and that a high percentage of these loans had been made
3(i For details, see the Economist, "Economy: Bapindo Scandal Highlights Crisis in Banking Industry," 
Economist Intelligence Unit—Country Report, August 5, 1994.
37 Nasution, "The Financial Crisis in Indonesia," p. 83.
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to its affiliated companies. In total, Bank Summa had amassed more than US$700 
million in nonperforming loans.38 Nasution notes:
Indonesia's weak market infrastructure, malfeasance, and malversation together 
have allowed the emergence of so-called "swindle" banks. The typical swindle 
bank makes loans to non-bank companies owned by its principal owner(s) to 
finance questionable investment projects, usually at inflated prices. Liabilities of 
such banks are mainly deposits owned by the general public, liquidity credit from 
Bank Indonesia, unsecured commercial paper sold to the general public (including 
foreigners), and equity shares owned by Bank Indonesia and other state-related 
institutions.. . .  Such banks typically have negative net worth.39
By the early 1990s, Bank Indonesia was quite aware that the country's banks, given 
their high level of exposure to property companies, faced a potentially disastrous 
problem. As is well known, investments in property and real estate are long-term and 
highly risky because they are very sensitive to future growth expectations. In contrast, 
the liabilities of the banks were mostly short-term and denominated in US dollars, 
Japanese yen, and other foreign currencies. Also, in many cases, banks had taken no 
collateral, and those which had taken collateral took a pledge over property as 
collateral for loans. In any case, they could hardly collect, because a fall in real estate 
prices would mean that by the time of default the property used to secure the loan 
would be worth only a small fraction of the outstanding loan principal amount. 
Moreover, as noted earlier, short-term borrowing from abroad was a relatively 
inexpensive source of funds, provided that the banks did not incur additional costs 
purchasing hedging instruments to protect themselves from any depreciation of the 
rupiah against the currency they had borrowed. Unhedged foreign currency borrowing 
posed an obvious risk to a bank in that any depreciation of the rupiah during the term 
of the loan would mean that the amount of rupiah needed to repay the loan on 
maturity would be far greater than the amount the borrower received upon drawing the 
loan. In short, Indonesian banks were faced with an unhedged funding mismatch 
between borrowing short-term from abroad in foreign currency and lending long-term in 
rupiah. All these asymmetries of the bank's balance sheets added greatly to their 
overall riskiness.
In an effort to address these problems, the Indonesian government enacted the 
Banking Law (known as Banking Act No. 7) in 1992. The Banking Law contained 
provisions designed to restrict the aggregate amount that a bank could lend to 
affiliated companies to 20 percent of the bank's capital, and it converted some state 
banks to limited liability companies and permitted them to lend only to nonpriority 
sectors. In 1995, reserve requirements was raised from 2 percent to 3 percent, effective 
February 1996. In addition, the minimum capital required for banks with foreign 
exchange licences was tripled, and the capital adequacy ratio for these banks was 
raised from 8 percent to 12 percent—with both these measures to be phased in over a 
five-year period ending in 2001. Bank Indonesia also developed a supervisory system 
patterned on the United States CAMEL system (Capital, Asset Quality, Management, 
Earnings, Liquidity), including annual on-site examinations of banks. However, the
38 Tony Shale, 'Top-Level Shakeout Needed to Mend the Financial System," Euromoney, June 1993, p. 55.
39 Nasution, "The Financial Crisis in Indonesia," pp. 85-6.
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enforcement of these measures was generally quite lax and violations rampant. Bank 
Indonesia's own report acknowledged that, as of March 1997, a significant number of 
banks remained undercapitalized and not in compliance with the prudential rules. 
While these figures most likely understate the extent of noncompliance, according to 
Bank Indonesia, fifteen banks did not meet the required 8 percent capital adequacy 
ratio in April 1996, while forty-one banks did not comply with the legal lending limit, 
and twelve licensed foreign exchange banks did not meet the rules on net open foreign 
exchange exposure.40 A more illustrative picture of the banks' continued high level of 
exposure to the property and real estate sector can be drawn from the fact that, during
1996, even as the glut in the property market became apparent and real estate prices 
began to nosedive, Indonesian banks continued to lend to property companies. In
1997, despite large-scale losses reported by the property industry, bank lending to the 
property sector totaled about 19.4 trillion rupiah, a 21 percent increase from 1996.41 
In July 1997, Bank Indonesia issued a decree that was intended severely to restrict 
bank credit to real estate developers, but it was too little too late. Undercapitalized 
and, in large measure, burdened with poorly diversified and badly performing loan 
portfolios, Indonesia's over-guaranteed but under-regulated banking system lay 
exposed and highly vulnerable to economic shocks. All it needed was a trigger. The 
trigger was the contagion from Thailand.
The Trigger and the Fallout
On July 2, 1997 the Bank of Thailand abandoned the baht's peg to its traditional 
basket, and the baht immediately depreciated sharply against the US dollar. Pressure 
then quickly intensified against the Philippine peso and the Malaysian ringgit—each of 
which received only limited support from their central bank. On July 8, the rupiah came 
under pressure. Although Indonesia had stronger macroeconomic fundamentals than 
Thailand (as it pertained to exports and the fiscal balance) and only a modest current 
account deficit, the rupiah was, nevertheless, vulnerable for two principal reasons. 
First, there was the huge foreign debt burden of the private Indonesian corporations 
(much of it short-term and not hedged against exchange-rate changes). Second, the 
fundamental weakness of the financial and banking sector raised doubts about the 
government's ability to defend the currency peg.
The Indonesian government's initial reaction to speculation against the rupiah was 
decisive. Rather than defending its currency and squandering a large portion of its 
reserves, as central banks in Thailand had done, Bank Indonesia, on July 11, widened 
the trading band for the rupiah from Rp. 192 (8 percent of the central rate) to Rp. 304 
(12 percent of the central rate) in a preemptive move designed to deter speculation. It 
also limited nonresident transactions in the forward market and introduced an array 
of tight monetary policies along with administrative measures to limit external 
borrowings by commercial banks.42 Despite the vigorous defense, the rupiah continued
40 Montgomery, "The Indonesian Financial System," p. 13.
41 Alistair Hammond, "A  Million Indonesian Construction Workers to Lose Jobs in '98," Bloomberg News, 
December 19,1997, available in LEXIS, News Library.
42 Bank Indonesia's Monetary Management Director, Dr. C. Harinowo, explained that "the benefit [of 
widening the rupiah band] is providing us more autonomy to managing monetary policy. We do not need to
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to slide, in large part because large domestic conglomerates, fearful that they would 
not be able to repay their foreign debts if the rupiah fell significantly, rushed to hedge 
these debts by buying US dollars. By July 21 the rupiah had fallen by 7 percent, in 
effect sharply depreciating to near the bottom of the new band. In response, on July 23, 
Bank Indonesia raised interest rates from 12 percent to 13 percent, and it intervened 
heavily in support of the rupiah. But this was to no avail, as the panic selling of rupiah 
and assets denominated in rupiah continued. When the rupiah depreciated by 13 
percent (from 2,400 per US dollar in July to 2,700 on the August 13), it was the last 
straw.
On August 14,1997, the Indonesian authorities, reluctant to squander more foreign 
reserves, allowed the rupiah to float.43 Immediately the rupiah depreciated sharply 
against the US dollar and other currencies in which the Indonesian banks had 
borrowed. Because of the depreciation, the amount of rupiah that Indonesian banks 
earned on their long-term loans to the property sector and other industries was no 
longer sufficient to service their short-term foreign borrowings. Moreover, the banks 
could no longer attract new funds from abroad that could be used to repay the short­
term borrowings coming close to maturation. In response, the Indonesian government 
raised short-term rupiah interest rates in order to attract rupiah deposits and stabilize 
the currency. For example, on August 11,1997, the overnight Jakarta interbank rupiah 
rate (or JIBOR) was 15.8 percent. A week later, on August 18, the overnight JIBOR was 
51.4 percent, and by August 22 the overnight JIBOR was 87.7 percent. However this 
failed to bring much of a reprieve, as the rupiah continued to weaken. The Ministry of 
Finance responded by cutting government spending through rescheduling some projects 
and limiting routine expenditures on non-priority items. It also further tightened 
liquidity by instructing the public sector—including state-owned enterprises—to shift 
their deposits from (mainly state-owned) commercial banks to Bank Indonesia. 
However, this also proved ineffective, as the rupiah continued to slide, gaining 
renewed momentum downward on August 21. In desperation, on August 29, Bank 
Indonesia issued a new rule limiting the forward sale of dollars to non-residents to 
US$5 million in order to reduce currency speculation.
It is not clear if the Indonesian authorities were in consultation with the IMF 
regarding the tight money policy. Bank Indonesia argued that the tight money policy 
was necessary to keep inflation under control and to stem the tide of large shifts into 
dollar holdings by residents. This is similar to the long-held IMF position that stresses 
the importance of high interest rates in keeping domestic currency holdings attractive, 
even if it complicates the situation of weak banks. In hindsight, we can recognize that 
an "overshoot" in the interest rate increase—an increase implemented through the 
tightening of liquidity by the Indonesian authorities—was very much responsible for 
the severe financial crisis that ensued. More than anything else, the tight money 
immediately exposed Indonesia's weak financial and banking systems. Bank runs
be concerned with the exchange rate, which affects monetary aggregates. It gives us a bigger cushion if there 
are any speculative attacks. It provides us with an experience of a floating-rate regime, but within a 
narrow confinement." See Callum Henderson, Asia Falling (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998), p. 127.
43 Soesastro and Basri note that between July 20 and August 13, Bank Indonesia's interventions in the 
market had depleted the reserves by over US$1.5 billion. Hadi Soesastro and Chatib Basri, "Survey of 
Recent Developments," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 34,1 (April,1998): 7.
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emerged as early as the second half of August 1999, when the process of "flight to 
safety" began. Faced with the prospect of widespread bank failures, Bank Indonesia 
had to scramble quickly to supply banks facing liquidity problems with funds, and by 
the end of August 1997 it had put up some US$500 million for the troubled banks.44
The injection of new liquidity and the lowering of short-term interest rates (the 
JIBOR rate fell to 40 percent in the first week of September) did provide a temporary 
reprieve.45 On September 23, finance minister Mar'ie Muhammad unveiled a 
comprehensive policy program to deal with the crisis.46 The program included: (a) 
stabilization of the rupiah at a new equilibrium level, (b) strengthening of fiscal policies 
and fiscal consolidation, (c) reduction of the current account deficit, (d) strengthening 
of the banking sector, and (e) strengthening of the private corporate sector. To achieve 
these objectives, the government made a pledge to further "loosen liquidity gradually 
and in accordance with the situation through fiscal and monetary instruments." 
Furthermore, it made a commitment to reduce interest rates and cancel or postpone 
over two hundred public sector-related development projects that would save the 
government some US$37 billion. These included the postponement of costly mega­
projects, such as construction of the Jakarta Tower, of the bridge between the Sumatra 
and the Malaysian peninsula, and of the Menara Jakarta bridge. In regards to the 
banking sector, the government announced its intention to merge state banks and 
liquidate the insolvent ones. Also, it made a commitment to follow-up quickly on the 
plan to encourage weak private banks to explore the possibility of merger. Finally, in a 
dramatic move, the 49 percent foreign ownership limit on Indonesian stocks was 
scrapped in order to increase the foreign investment in the stock market.
These announcements succeeded in bringing a measure of calm to the markets. As 
the rupiah stabilized around Rp. 3,000 per US dollar, some thought that the worse 
was over. However, it was only a temporary reprieve—the calm before the storm. Part 
of the dilemma was that Indonesia was facing a confidence problem, and despite all 
the concerted effort, the government failed to restore confidence. However, a bigger 
problem was that, as ambitious as the finance ministry's program was, it did not go 
far enough. For example, rather than postponing or dismantling inefficient and 
profligate monopolies, such as the state-owned aircraft manufacturer Industri Resawat 
Terbang Nusantara (IPTN), a pet project of the Suharto protege, B. J. Habibie, or the 
national car project owned largely by Suharto's youngest son, Hutomo (Tommy) 
Mandala Putra, the government reaffirmed its commitment to continue to support 
these projects.47 As regional currencies and stock markets continued to plummet, and
44 Soesastro and Basri, "Survey of Recent Developments," p. 9.
45 This measure, of course, reduced the costs incurred by banks borrowing in the interbank market.
46 Mar'ie Muhammad, "Statement by the Hon. Mar'ie Muhammad at the 1997 World Bank/ IMF Annual 
Meeting in Hong Kong," IMF press release no. 25, September 23,1997.
47 The national car policy was promulgated in the Presidential Instruction No. 2/1996 which gave a 
"pioneer" status to PT Timor Putra Nasional—jointly owned by Suharto's youngest son and KIA Motor 
Corporation of South Korea. This exclusive status exempted the company from paying 65 percent maximum 
import duties for car spare-parts, and 35 percent maximum import duty and luxury goods sale tax that make 
up over 60 percent of the cost of car production in Indonesia. Moreover, to boost the sale of the car, the 
public sector was required to purchase it. Fully backed by the Indonesian government, Bank Indonesia, and 
a consortium of four state-owned banks and twelve private domestic banks, the company received an initial
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amidst reports that Indonesian banks and private companies were having great 
difficulty in meeting their external debt service obligations, the pressure on the rupiah 
re-intensified. By early October the rupiah had fallen by more than 40 percent since 
July (the fastest depreciation among the crisis countries), while the Jakarta Stock 
Market Index dropped by 44 percent.48 On October 6, the Indonesian government sold 
another US$650 million in the foreign exchange market to stabilize the external value of 
the rupiah.49 Again, this was to no avail. On October 8, when the exchange rate 
passed 3,800 rupiah to the U.S. dollar, Indonesia turned to the IMF for "consultation" 
and "technical assistance."50
On October 31 (after some three weeks of discussions), the Indonesian government 
negotiated a financial bailout package totaling some US$43 billion in international 
assistance with the IMF and bilateral donors. The package consisted of US$23 billion 
of the so-called "first line of funds" negotiated with the IMF and a "second line of 
funds" negotiated with bilateral donors. These included Japan (US$5 billion), 
Singapore (US$5 billion), United States ($3 billion), Malaysia (US$1 billion), Australia 
(US$1 billion), Brunei (US$1.2 billion) and China and Hong Kong SAR.51 Of the US$10 
billion from the IMF, US$3 billion was to be disbursed immediately, and a further 
US$3 billion was to be made available after March 15, 1998, provided the Indonesian 
government met the program's economic targets. The rest of the money was to be 
disbursed on a quarterly basis, provided the targets continued to be met.52 The entire 
agreement was to be implemented over a three-year period and carefully monitored 
jointly by the Indonesian government and the IMF, including experts from the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank.
The mood was one of cautious optimism after the signing of the October 31 
agreement. It was widely believed that the agreement would restore investor confidence 
and arrest the rupiah's continuing plunge.53 IMF Managing Director, Michel 
Camdessus, summed up the prevailing mood when he noted that "these measures 
should restore confidence in the Indonesian economy and contribute to the 
stabilization of regional financial markets."54 Indeed, initially the program received 
positive response from the market, resulting in the rupiah strengthening from Rp. 3,700
US$960 million for its production and assembly facility. King notes that "this cronyism was so brazen . . .  
as to anger even the regime's staunchest supporters." King, "Corruption in Indonesia," p. 617.
48 Soesastro and Basri, "Survey of Recent Developments," p. 10.
49 Nasution, "The Financial Crisis in Indonesia," p. 88.
50 Finance minister Mar'ie Muhammad made it clear that the government was only seeking the IMF's 
technical assistance, and would explore the possibility of financial support only as a precaution. Indeed, 
on October 8, the IMF was invited for consultation only, and no explicit request for a loan was made. See 
Soesastro and Basri, "Survey of Recent Developments," p. 10; also Hill, The Indonesian Economy in Crisis, 
p. 15.
51 While the technical details of the bilateral assistance were worked out between Indonesia and the 
individual countries, the United States made it clear that its loans could be drawn upon only if Indonesia 
followed the agreement with the IMF.
52 IMF, "Indonesian Measures Welcomed as Important Step in Stabilizing Southeast Asian Financial 
Markets," IMF Survey 26,21 (November 17,1997).
53 David Liebhold, "Rough Road Ahead," Asian Business 30 ,2  (February 1998).
54 IMF, "Camdessus Commends on Indonesia's Impressive Economic Policy Program," IMF Survey 26,20, 
November 3,1997.
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to Rp. 3,200 per dollar. However, it was too early to celebrate. The economic program 
the Indonesian government had committed to in its "letter of intent" to die IMF (which 
now became part of the agreement) was quite extensive.55 For example, it included, 
among other things, (a) trade policy reform, in particular, trade deregulation for 
various commodities via the elimination of BULOG's (Badan Urusan Logistik—Food 
Distribution Agency) monopoly on import of wheat, wheat flour, soybeans, and garlic 
effective January 1, 1998; (b) gradual reduction of import tariffs on chemical products, 
iron and steel, and fisheries products; (c) industry policy reform, such as the 
elimination of local content program for automobiles by 2000 and the implementation 
of the WTO decision on the National Car project by 2000; and (d) macroeconomic 
policy targets for economic growth, inflation rate, current account deficit, and fiscal 
balance, as well as economic reform measures covering investment and financial 
institutions. At the core of the latter was the program to reform the banking industry.
Specifically, based on data made available by Bank Indonesia which documented 
the financial condition of 92 of the 238 banks, representing 85 percent of the assets of 
the banking system, the IMF and the Indonesian government agreed on a 
comprehensive bank resolution package consisting of:
(1) intensified supervision, including frequent and detailed reviews, in addition to 
daily monitoring of key elements like liquidity and foreign exchange exposure for six of 
the country's largest private banks (market share: 18 percent) in which some critical 
weaknesses had been identified;
(2) rehabilitation plans for seven small private banks;
(3) conservatorship for three small, severely under-capitalized private banks, and for 
six insolvent regional development banks (market share 0.4 percent);
(4) transfer of the performing assets for two insolvent state-owned banks (market 
share: 9.6 percent) to a third state-owned bank; merger of the two insolvent banks and 
transformation of the resulting entity into an asset recovery agency;
(5) definition and implementation of rehabilitation plans for ten insolvent private 
banks (market share: 3 percent) that had benefited from a Bank Indonesia-sponsored 
and legally binding rescue package prior to the crisis, accelerating their return to 
solvency; and
(6) closure of sixteen small and deeply insolvent private banks (market share: 2.5 
percent), with protection limited to small depositors.
In total, the agreement included fifty banks, representing 34.3 percent of the 
banking system. However, on November 1, 1997 (less than twenty-four hours after 
reaching the agreement with the IMF), the Indonesian government abruptly suspended 
the operating licenses of the sixteen banks—in effect, closing them down.56 This action
55 The "letter of intent" released by the Indonesian government on October 31,1997 described the policies 
that Indonesia intended to implement in the context of its request for financial support from the IMF. For 
details, see IMF, "Letter of Intent: Indonesia."
56 The liquidated banks were: Bank Harapan Sentosa; Sejahtera Bank Umum; Bank Andromeda; Bank 
Pacific; Bank Guna Internasional; Bank Astria Raya; Bank Dwipa Semesta; Bank Jakarta; Bank Industri; 
Bank Citrahasta Dhanamanunggal; South East Asia Bank; Bank Mataram Dhanarta; Bank Pinaesaan;
Bank Anrico; Bank Umum Majapahit Jaya and Bank Kosagraha Semesta.
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proved to be disastrous. As Soesastro and Basri note, "the closure of sixteen 
commercial banks created panic in the country, leading to large withdrawals by 
depositors even from banks that were generally believed to be healthy. Suddenly, 
confidence in domestic private banks was shattered."57 As a result, there was further 
"flight to quality" as depositors sought to move their funds out of the private banks 
that were believed to be in trouble into the state banks, which were widely thought to 
be more secure. Literally overnight many banks lost their deposit base, besides finding 
that trade and other financial lines from their bank business abroad were terminated. 
Letters of credit issued by many Indonesian banks were no longer accepted overseas. It 
seemed that market confidence had been completely lost.
Why did the closure o f just sixteen small and insolvent banks with only 2.5 percent o f the 
total banking assets generate such a panic? According to Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs, 
it was due to the IMF's "misguided policies."58 He claims that the closure of the banks 
was not necessary. By hastily closing banks in an environment where no deposit 
insurance was in place, the IMF generated panic that quickly became a full-blown 
financial crisis. Indeed, the closures exacerbated the ongoing liquidity squeeze in 
financial markets, making it much more difficult for all banks to continue their normal 
lending operations. The IMF's demand for tighter fiscal and monetary policy when 
budgets were broadly in balance, and when the economy was already beginning to 
contract, made little sense. Hal Hill aptly blames the IMF's "scatter-gun approach," 
which "overloaded the reform agenda, forcing bureaucratically stretched governments 
to quickly tackle a vast array of highly complex and sensitive policy issues" and which 
"attempted to resolve banking sector distress too quickly, [thus] aggravating the 
general loss of confidence."59
Yet, having said this, it is important to recognize that Sachs is only partly correct 
and the IMF only partly to blame for Indonesia's financial crisis. While there is little 
question that pressure from the IMF forced the Indonesian government to take its first 
significant step toward restructuring the banking sector (by liquidating sixteen of the 
weakest private banks), the problem was not the closure of these weak banks, per se, 
but the manner in which it was done.60 First, while the agreement mentioned fifty 
banks, only sixteen were closed—and these sixteen were clearly insolvent on the basis 
of data provided by the banks to Bank Indonesia.61 Since the remaining thirty-four 
banks were not identified, it created uncertainty among the general public regarding the 
fate of all other banks. After all, not only was the public generally aware that some 
well-connected banks were not listed, there was also no deposit insurance in place.62
57 Soesastro and Basri, "Survey of Recent Developments," p. 19.
58 Jeffrey Sachs, "The Wrong Medicine for Asia," New York Times, November 3,1997.
59 Hill, The Indonesian Economy in Crisis, pp. 52-3.
60 Indeed, the IMF saw the forced liquidation of the sixteen banks as a sufficiently important step towards 
reforming the banking system. Thus, on November 5,1997, the Fund approved the three-year Stand-By 
Arrangement (totaling US$10 billion)—and released the first installment of the promised aid package.
61 Charles Enoch, "Interventions in Banks During Banking Crises: The Experience of Indonesia," IMF 
Policy Discussion Paper. PDP/00/2. Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department, 2000.
62 In all fairness it should be mentioned that a blanket deposit guarantee was not introduced because of the 
moral hazard effect. It was believed that the sixteen banks being closed were very small, and hence, there 
was no need for such a guarantee.
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Nor was there a strategy in place for dealing with the liabilities and assets (both good 
and bad) of either the closed banks or those that remained open. At the same time, a 
lack of disclosure regarding the health of remaining banks meant that nothing was done 
to allay depositors' concerns about the health of the rest of the sector. It is hardly 
surprising that, given such uncertainty, depositors' initial concern soon ballooned and 
initiated a full-scale run on the banking system as a whole.
Second, although among the sixteen banks listed for closure was Bank Andromeda 
(partly owned by one of Suharto's sons, Bambang Trihatmodjo) and Bank Jakarta 
(partly owned by Suharto's half-brother, Probosutejo), the fact that only the smallest 
and weakest banks in the country (with less than 2.5 percent of Indonesia's total 
banking assets), were targeted for closure failed to generate public confidence. To the 
contrary, the general public, including foreign investors, cognizant of the fact that these 
sixteen closures would hardly have a significant impact on the "health" of the banking 
system as a whole, braced for more bank closures.
Third, the situation was made worse when, on November 5, Bambang Trihatmodjo 
filed a lawsuit against the Governor of Bank Indonesia and the Minister of Finance 
against the closure of his Bank Andromeda. The fact that Bank Andromeda was back 
in operation in no time—under the name of Bank Alfa (but using the same building, 
employees, and a new foreign exchange licence issued by Bank Indonesia)—and that 
several of the earlier canceled "development" projects of Suharto's family and cronies 
were suddenly back in operation, convinced many that the Suharto regime was not 
serious about implementing the agreed-upon reforms.63
From late November onwards, things began to go seriously wrong. For starters, the 
extent of the private sector foreign debt was revealed to be much larger than most 
analysts had realized.64 Many Indonesian firms and financial institutions previously 
thought to be sound had, in fact, incurred large debt burdens in foreign currencies that 
they could not service from their rupiah earnings at the prevailing unfavorable 
exchange rate. These entities were effectively bankrupt. Furthermore, as the 
international financial markets lost confidence in Indonesian banks, they refused to 
rollover short-term debt and accept letters of credit. Also, the government decision to 
limit access to foreign borrowings and to shift public sector deposits from (mainly 
state-owned) commercial banks to the central bank squeezed liquidity. With banks 
suddenly not liquid, default by corporate borrowers increased. In this capricious and 
unpredictable environment, bank deposit runs multiplied amid rumors that a new 
wave of bank closures was under preparation. By mid-December, 154 banks 
representing half of the total assets of the system had faced, to varying degrees, some 
erosion of their deposit base. Also, during December 1997, Bank Indonesia's liquidity 
support increased from 13 trillion rupiah to 31 trillion rupiah, equivalent to 5 percent 
of GDP.65 Insofar as the liquidity support, paid in rupiah, was needed by banks to 
meet reductions in dollar deposits, in effect it served to fuel capital flight and, thus,
63 Liebhold, "Rough Road Ahead."
64 While no authoritative figures existed on the size of the debt, it was widely believed to be substantial. 
Estimates ranges from US$35 to US$70 billion—much higher than Indonesia's official foreign reserves.
65 Lindgren, et al., "Financial Sector Crisis."
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the continuing depreciation of the exchange rate.66 In contrast to the situations in other 
crisis-hit countries, in Indonesia efforts at sterilization were not successful, reflecting a 
loss of monetary control by Bank Indonesia. By late December, the rupiah was 
fluctuating in a wide range around Rp. 5,000 to 6,000 per US dollar.
The Banking Crisis becomes Systemic
On January 6, 1998, President Suharto presented to the Parliament a draft budget 
for the fiscal year 1998/99.67 The proposed budget totaled Rp. 133 trillion, a 32.1 
percent increase as compared to the previous year's budget of Rp. 101 trillion. The 
draft budget was based on the "balanced budget" principle (which limits the size of 
budget deficit to the level that can be financed by foreign aid and loans), and 
calculated based on assumptions about future conditions: an exchange rate (Rp. 4000 
per US$1), annual economic rate of growth of 4 percent, and inflation rate of 9 
percent. The budget also failed to produce the surplus of 1 percent, as stipulated in the 
IMF agreement. In fact, the expansionary budget was in direct contravention of IMF 
requirements for a 1 percent budget surplus.68 Almost immediately, the markets 
reacted negatively to the "unrealistic" expansionary budget, a problem further 
compounded by the collapse (on January 13, 1998) of Peregrine, a Hong Kong-based 
investment bank, which was ruined by a single massive bad loan (US$265 million) to 
PT Steady Safe, a local taxi company in Jakarta.69 As questions about Suharto's 
commitment to implementing the program once again came to the forefront, the rupiah 
headed into a free fall.70 The exchange rate dropped from Rp. 5,450 per US$1 on 
January 1 to the infamous "black Thursday" on January 8, when it fell below the 
"psychological threshold" of Rp. 10,000 to US$1—leading to panic food buying and 
social unrest71 In desperation, Suharto hinted at the possibility of issuing Indonesian 
dollar banknotes that could replace real dollars and be put in a special dollar deposit 
with high interest rates. The president's daughter, Siti Hardijanti Rukmana (Tutut), 
promoted Gerakan Cinta Rupiah or "Getar" ("we love the rupiah" movement) to 
encourage citizens to change their cash dollar holdings into rupiah. However, the 
initiative was ineffective. The value of the rupiah continued to slide, reaching Rp.
66 Moreover, these credits added substantially to the money supply and helped to fuel inflation in early 
1998.
67 The budget would take effect from April 1,1998.
68 Why did Suharto choose to defy the IMF? There seem to be two considerations. First, there was concern 
that a contractionary budget would force many Indonesian companies, including those owned by his family 
members and cronies, into bankruptcy, and second, that the elimination of food and fuel subsidies would 
ignite civil disorder. For details, see Jose Manuel Tesoro, "Gearing for Trouble: Suharto will spend to avert 
potential unrest," Asiaweek, January 16,1998.
69 Steady Safe used US$145 million to buy 14 percent of a toll road building company owned by Suharto's 
eldest daughter, Tutut. She was then named to Steady Safe board.
70 A report in the Washington Post (January 8,1998), mentioned that both the IMF and the United States 
Treasury were unhappy with Suharto's budget, and questioned his commitment to implementing the agreed 
IMF program. See, Radelet, "Indonesia: Long Road to Recovery," The Washington Post, January 8,1998, p. 
11 .
71 McLeod, "Indonesia in Crisis," p. 225.
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10,200 to US$1.00 on January 11, 1998. Under these circumstances, the Indonesian 
government had little choice but to concede to the IMF.
On January 15, in a well-publicized official ceremony witnessed by IMF managing 
director Michel Camdessus, President Suharto signed his second "Letter of Intent" 
with the IMF.72 It is clear that in the second reform package, the IMF was able to 
secure a far greater range of reform commitments. Specifically, as stated in the letter of 
intent, the Indonesian government pledged to implement a fifty-point "Memorandum 
of Economic and Financial Policies," drafted under the guidance of the IMF.73 The 
program included a range of provisions; on fiscal policy, for instance, it called for the 
revision of the draft budget for fiscal 1998/99. Recognizing that, given the sharp 
depreciation of the rupiah and the deterioration in the economy, it was no longer 
feasible to aim at a surplus of 1 percent of GDP, the memorandum settled for a deficit 
at 1 percent of GDP. This was to be achieved via expenditure reduction, namely, the 
elimination of fuel and electricity subsidies. Non-budget expenditures, such as 
investment fund and reforestation fund, were to be incorporated into the central 
government budget. Regarding public sector projects, the program called for
. . . canceling immediately the twelve infrastructure projects that were recently 
postponed or placed under review. Moreover, budgetary and extra-budgetary 
support and credit privileges granted to IPTN's airplane projects will be 
discontinued, effective immediately. In addition, all special tax, customs, and 
credit privileges for the National Car project will be revoked, effective 
immediately.
The program also made clear that Bank Indonesia should continue to adopt a tight 
monetary policy and must be "given full autonomy to conduct monetary policy, and 
start immediately to unilaterally decide interest rates on its SBI (central bank) 
certificates."74 In order to improve domestic competition, the program required cartel­
like marketing arrangements, including those in plywood, cloves, cement, paper and 
steel, to be eliminated by February 1. That is, that "from February 1, BULOG's 
monopoly will be limited solely to rice." On investment and foreign trade, the program 
called for the elimination of restrictions on foreign investment in palm oil, wholesale 
and retail trade, and content regulations and export taxes on a wide range of 
products, including leather, cork, ores, logs, sawn lumber, rattan, and minerals. Finally, 
it called for the deregulation and privatization of selected state-owned enterprises and 
strategic industries.
72 Much was made of this event by the media. As Bresnan notes, "as Suharto affixed his signature, IMF 
managing director Michel Camdessus stood over him, arms folded across his chest, looking every inch the 
school-master he was playing in the drama. The photograph of this scene became a symbol of the charged 
issue at the heart of the negotiations—whether the IMF, and through it the United States, had the right to 
dictate terms to the Indonesian government in return for help in restoring confidence in its economy." See, 
John Bresnan, "The United States, the IMF, and the Indonesian Financial Crisis," in The Politics o f Post- 
Suharto Indonesia, ed. Adam Schwarz and Jonathan Paris (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 
1999), p. 93.
73 See IMF. "Statement by the Managing Director on the IMF Program with Indonesia," News Brief No. 
98/2, January 15,1998; see also IMF. "Indonesia: Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies," 
January 15, 1998 (http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/011598.htm)
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Despite the seemingly comprehensive nature of the reform package, it failed to 
restore market confidence. Part of the problem had to do with the growing rift between 
the IMF and the Suharto regime. The widely held (and generally correct) perception 
was that the wily Suharto had signed on to the program only reluctantly, and that he 
did not intend to follow through with a program that would hurt the business interests 
involved in the vast financial empire controlled by his children (estimated to be worth 
around US$30 billion74 5) or the interests of his close associates. Indeed, even before the 
IMF team had left Jakarta, Suharto began sending mixed signals regarding his 
commitment to the program. In an act of open defiance, he made it public that he 
wanted his long-time friend and the big-spending Technology Minister, B. J. Habibie, to 
be his vice-presidential candidate (and presumed successor) in the upcoming March 
polls.76 Moreover, as Radelet has aptly noted, the new IMF program—which eased up 
slightly on fiscal policy and on the capital adequacy ratio required for banks, but 
otherwise kept the same basic strategy as the first policy—was misguided.77 It was 
misguided because excess demand was not at the root of Indonesia's problems, and 
the capital withdrawals well underway meant that the economy was already 
contracting significantly. The initial fiscal tightening simply added to the contraction, 
further undermining investor confidence and fueling capital flight.78 Finally, the 
structural reforms envisaged in the program, while necessary over the long-term, did 
not provide any concrete solutions to the immediate problems of the banking and 
currency crisis. Specifically, the program did not articulate a clear strategy to resolve 
the banking sector problems (i.e. it did not have concrete bank rehabilitation and 
restructuring measures that could restore confidence in the banking system), nor did it 
provide a plan to deal with Indonesia's short-term foreign debt. The market's lack of 
confidence was reflected in the continued downhill slide of the rupiah. Less than a 
week later, on January 22, the rupiah fell to an unprecedented all-time low of Rp. 
17,000 to the US dollar. Moreover, left unattended, the banking sector problems turned 
into a full-fledged systemic crisis, with liquidity support from Bank Indonesia 
exceeding over sixty trillion rupiah (about 6 percent of 1998 GDP), with the risk of 
hyperinflation and complete financial sector meltdown looming menacingly on the 
horizon.
Finally, on January 27, with their backs against the wall and under pressure from 
the IMF, the Indonesian government took steps to deal with the banking sector 
problems. It announced a three-point "emergency plan." First, the government 
announced a blanket guarantee of the rupiah and foreign currency denominated debts 
of all domestically incorporated banks. The guarantee extended to deposits and most
74 SBI's, or "Sertifikat Bank Indonesia," are issued every Wednesday with a one month duration, but 
beginning in October 1998, Bank Indonesia also began to issue three-month SBI's.
75 See Philip Shenon, "For the First Family of Indonesia, an Empire Now in leopardy," New York Times, 
January 16, 1998.
76 It was well known that Habibie, who had major financial stake in almost every business activity in 
Indonesia, epitomized the unscrupulous crony capitalism and the perverse business subculture. It was no 
secret that the IMF and the United States did not want him to be vice-president. See Bresnan, "The United 
States, the IMF," pp. 92-4.
77 Radelet, "Indonesia: Long Road to Recovery."
78 Of course, several months later the IMF recognized this fatal mistake and eased up on its fiscal targets in 
Indonesia (as it did in Korea and Thailand), but the damage had been done.
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types of creditor claims—excluding subordinated debt.79 The blanket guarantee on 
deposits (confirming Bank Indonesia's determination to exercise its last-resort 
function, even if it exacted a heavy toll) was designed to stem bank runs and thereby 
stabilize the banking system. In addition, Bank Indonesia placed restrictions on credit 
growth and announced it would set weekly ceilings on the maximum interest rates that 
banks could pay on deposits. Second, a new regulatory body for the banking industry, 
the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA), was established under a 
presidential decree for a period of five years.80 Established as an "independent" 
agency, reporting to the Ministry of Finance (but with advisors from the New York- 
based investment banks Lehman Brothers and JP Morgan), IBRA's task was to take 
over and rehabilitate weak banks and administer the government's guarantee program 
for bank debts. The IBRA was also empowered to establish a separate asset 
management entity called the Asset Management Unit (AMU) to take over non­
performing assets from banks that were either to be liquidated or merged into stronger 
institutions. Not only was the Banking Law amended to give the AMU the power 
needed to deal with problem banks, all banks were required to have their loan 
portfolios reviewed by internationally recognized audit firms by the end of 1998. Also, 
IBRA was given the responsibility for collecting from the majority shareholders of the 
private banks the amounts that their banks owed Bank Indonesia in connection with 
the liquidity support that they had received. Third, a framework for handling 
corporate restructuring was proposed; in particular, the emergency plan recommended 
a temporary voluntary suspension of corporate external debt payment. However, the 
government made it clear that there would be no use of public financing, guarantee, or 
subsidy to erase the debt and reimburse unguaranteed creditors looking for financial 
redress.
Although IBRA was hardly an autonomous agency (its effectiveness was 
compromised by a weak legal and regulatory framework and also by its need to obtain 
political authority, even for technical operations), the fact that its restructuring agenda 
looked feasible raised hopes that finally something substantive was being done to deal 
with the country's banking problems. Based on its review of the banks' financial 
position, IBRA divided banks that had received substantial liquidity support from 
Bank Indonesia (i.e. more than 500 percent of their total equity) into categories A and 
B. Category A banks included those that had received liquidity support equal to or in 
excess of 75 percent of their total assets, and Category B banks were those that 
received less than 75 percent, but still equal to or in excess of two trillion rupiah. 
Category A banks were to be liquidated, whereas Category B banks were to have the 
rights of their shareholders suspended and their existing managers replaced by IBRA— 
which would assume full management control.81 IBRA also made it explicit that the 
former majority shareholders of the suspended banks must pay the government two 
separate amounts: first, the outstanding negative balance that their respective bank
79 The guarantee was due to expire on January 31,2000. At that time it would be replaced by a deposit 
insurance scheme. The guarantee was retroactively applied to the sixteen closed banks. The guarantee, 
however, excluded debts of bank owners and subordinated debts.
80 Prior to the creation of IBRA, Bank Indonesia was the primary supervisory body for the banking 
industry. IBRA is known in Bahasa Indonesia as Badan Penyehatan Perbanken Nasional (BPPN).
81 For details, see Republic of Indonesia Presidential Decree No. 27/1998, January 26,1998. 
http://www.indoexchange.com/babong/general/bppn/who/tengah.html
The Indonesian Financial Crisis 101
had accumulated with Bank Indonesia, and second, the amount by which their 
respective banks' intra-group lending exceeded the affiliated lending limits before 
September 21, 1998.82 The announcement of this new and ambitious plan was able to 
slow bank runs and restore a modicum of financial stability. On January 28, the 
exchange rate recovered to Rp. 12,500 per US dollar, and appreciated further in the 
subsequent days to rally at Rp. 9,950 per US dollar on February 16. IBRA's early 
actions resulted in the closure of a large number of banks which had severely negative 
net worth and no significant value or franchise importance to the system. Specifically, 
by February 14, fifty-four distressed banks (consisting of four state banks, thirty-nine 
private national banks, and eleven regional development banks comprising 36.7 
percent of the banking sector) that had borrowed heavily from Bank Indonesia were 
brought under the auspices of the IBRA. The four state-owned banks (Bapindo, Bank 
Bumi Daya, Bank Dagang Negara or BDNI, and Bank Exim), accounted for 24.7 
percent of the liabilities of the banking sector.83
However, just when the government's plan seem to be working—making believers 
of some of the cynics—interference by Suharto once again undermined the efforts.84 
First, Suharto refused to publicize the operations of IBRA. As a result, IBRA officials 
had to work over the following weeks against a public perception that IBRA was a 
"paper-tiger" and still not operational. As the IMF study reports, "the initial workings 
of IBRA were not apparent to the public, there was confusion as to the authorities' 
intentions, and the momentum generated by the January 27 announcement was largely 
lost."85 More damaging, on February 17, Suharto abruptly fired one of the few 
reformers in his regime, the highly respected Governor of Bank Indonesia, Sudradjad 
Djiwandono, less than two weeks before the official end of his tenure.86 It was 
reported that Suharto fired Djiwandono after the governor "had argued that Suharto 
was about to subvert an economic recovery plan he reluctantly signed just last month 
with the IMF."87 In late February, Suharto dismissed the head of IBRA and, to make 
matters worse, started making increasingly hostile remarks about the IMF, culminating 
in a reported statement to a largely Muslim audience that the IMF package could not 
be implemented because it violated Article 33 of the Indonesian constitution. If 
Suharto's obscurantism and well-worn pattern of double-entendres and half-measures 
frustrated the IMF and the donor countries, his plan to create a fixed exchange rate 
system for the volatile rupiah through a currency board in direct opposition to the IMF, 
the United States, the European Community, Japan and other donor governments was 
more than could be tolerated.
82 Karene Witcher and Jay Solomon, "Jakarta Takes Over Much of the Bank System/' Asian Wall Street 
Journal, August 24,1998.
83 Lindgren, et al., "Financial Sector Crisis," p. 59.
84 Mohammad Sadli, "The Indonesian Crisis," in Southeast Asia's Economic Crisis: Origins, Lessons and the 
Way Forward, ed. H. W. Arndt and Hal Hill (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999).
85 Lindgren, et al., "Financial Sector Crisis," p. 59.
86 Kenward notes that "by mid-April [1998], all senior management at the central bank had been changed. 
Among the new Managing Directors, barely half had experience in a central bank." See Lloyd Kenward, 
"What Has Been Happening at Bank Indonesia," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 35,1, (1999): 122.
87 David Sanger, "Risking IMF Aid, Suharto Dismisses Central Banker," New York Times, February 18, 
1998.
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While rumors that Indonesia might adopt a currency board had been around for 
weeks, by mid-February Jakarta began to send implicit messages that it would 
unilaterally establish a currency board, unless the Fund came up with a better 
alternative for strengthening the rupiah.88 On February 11, the Minister of Finance 
announced that the government was preparing steps towards setting up a currency 
board system. Following the appointment on February 17 of US-trained economist, 
Sjahril Sabirin, as the new Bank Indonesia Governor, and of John Hopkins University 
economist, Steve Hanke, as adviser to President Suharto's economic council, the 
Indonesian government embarked on a media blitz to make its case for a currency 
board regime. The government now claimed that, unlike an ordinary exchange-rate peg, 
the predictability and rule-based nature of a currency board would impose strict 
discipline on the government—preventing it, for example, from abusing the central 
bank's printing presses to fund large deficits. Using the example of the Hong Kong 
dollar—which had been officially fixed at HK$7.80 per American dollar since the 
board was introduced in 1983, and which had weathered the crisis reasonably well— 
supporters argued that, since the currency board holds extremely low-risk interest- 
bearing bonds and other assets denominated in the anchor currency, it not only 
encourages arbitrage, but also offers an effective barrier against speculative attacks 
and rapid currency appreciations. Moreover, they claimed that currency boards 
provide stability to the banking and financial system by maintaining market-adjusted 
interest rates and prudentially controlling destabilizing international capital flows.
While the IMF, in principle, is not opposed to emerging economies establishing 
currency boards, it strongly opposed the Indonesian plan—threatening to withhold 
funding—because it felt that a currency board was a "quick-fix" and an ultimately 
unsustainable solution for Indonesia.89 Rather, the IMF argued that it was important 
for Indonesia to implement the agreed-upon reforms before establishing a currency 
board. This was based on sound economic reasoning: a currency board arrangement 
can only work effectively if the banking system has the capacity to tolerate significant 
movements in domestic interest rates. Without this capacity, the currency board 
arrangement will induce a conversion of deposits into foreign exchange, further shrink 
the monetary base, and greatly increase interest rates. Since a currency board must 
hold reserves of foreign exchange (or gold or some other liquid asset) equal at the fixed 
rate of exchange to at least 100 percent of the domestic currency issued, the IMF 
appropriately concluded that Indonesia's US$12 billion in disclosed foreign exchange 
reserves (as of March 20, 1998) and a foreign debt of $130 billion were simply 
inadequate to back the estimated 24 trillion rupiah in circulation—the reserves would 
be drained in a few weeks.90
Moreover, the IMF had good reason to suspect that the Suharto regime would dip 
into the loans to support the currency board—after all, it was already injecting 
massive doses of liquidity to bail out the country's weak banking system. The IMF
88 Peter Passell, "Economic Scene: In Indonesia, Slowdown on a Risky Bet," New York Times, February 19, 
1998.
89 In February 1998, a leaked letter from the IMF's managing director threatened the withdrawal of 
financial support if a currency board was established. C. Johnson, "Survey of Recent Developments," 
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 32,2 (1998): 27-8.
90 Jose Manuel Tesoro, "A Quick Fix? Maybe Not," Asiaweek, March 6,1998.
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found the Hong Kong example as spurious. In Hong Kong, the Exchange Fund is 
committed to 100 percent foreign currency backing for Hong Kong dollar bank notes, 
and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) has an explicit mandate to act as an 
official lender of last resort and has been involved in open market operations since 
1990. Further, Hong Kong (unlike Indonesia) has formidable foreign reserves totaling 
over US$85 billion (in 1997-98) to cover the currency in circulation plus demand 
deposits. This gave the HKMA tremendous autonomy to raise short-term interest rates 
to make it expensive for speculators to obtain Hong Kong dollar credit. Unlike 
Indonesia's banks, Hong Kong's well-regulated and capitalized banks, which had very 
low levels of non-performing loans, could cope with the increases in short-term interest 
rates that might be needed to defend the currency board. Finally, with justifiable 
reason, the Fund remained highly suspicious of the "Suharto plan," under which the 
rupiah's rate would be 5,000 to the dollar, or about twice as strong as the then current 
rate. Since a currency board is committed to exchanging, on demand and without any 
limit, foreign currency and local currency, and in some cases must also exchange bank 
reserves at a pre-announced exchange rate, the IMF felt that the currency board was a 
ploy to allow Suharto's children and cronies to retrench discretionary and egregious 
rent-seeking structures, quickly change their substantial rupiah holdings into dollars at 
an artificially high rate, and then move those funds into offshore accounts. It should be 
noted that if capital outflows are sufficiently large, a currency board could collapse 
because of a shortage of foreign assets. In Indonesia, where the government in 1997-98 
could not even provide complete cover for the domestic currency, the currency board 
would simply wipe out its remaining foreign currency reserves before the entire 
domestic currency stock had been converted.
The End of the New Order and Conversion to Orde Reformasi
In the ensuing weeks, as Suharto vacillated and stalled, the economic downturn 
deepened, and the Indonesian economy was brought to the brink of total collapse.91 
Liquidity support to the banking sector continued to increase—largely to meet 
continuing deposit withdrawals—further eroding public confidence in the banking 
reforms underway. As tensions between the Suharto regime and the IMF intensified, 
the IMF (on March 6) announced the suspension of the second installment of the 
bailout package.92 Nevertheless, on March 10, the People's Consultative Assembly, 
chose, by acclamation, Suharto as president and B. J. Habibie as vice-president.93 
With the seventy-seven-year-old Suharto now set to serve an unprecedented seventh 
five-year term as president (ending in the year 2003), all hopes for an early resolution
91 James Levinsohn, Steven Berry, and Jed Friedman, "Impacts of the Indonesian Economic Crisis: Price 
Changes and the Poor," NBER Working Paper, 7197. June, 1999.
92 Johnson, "Survey of Recent Developments," p. 27.
93 Following the 1945 Constitution, the People's Consultative Assembly (PCA) met quinquennially, within 
a few months after a parliamentary election, to elect the president and vice-president and establish the 
broad outlines of state policy for the next five-year term. The parliament or DPR (Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat) consisted of five hundred members—four hundred of these were elected and the remaining one 
hundred were military appointees. The so-called super-parliament, the (MPR) Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat or People's Consultative Assembly, consisted of all members of the DPR, plus an additional five 
hundred appointees made by Suharto.
104 Shalendra D. Sharma
of the stalemate with the IMF were dashed. Indeed, in an open act of defiance to the 
IMF and bilateral donors, Suharto refused to appoint reformers to key cabinet 
positions. Instead, his choose loyalists and a close circle of cronies, including his eldest 
daughter, Tutut, and his closest business crony and golf partner, Bob Hasan, among 
others. It seemed that the old corrupt establishment was entrenching itself for the long 
haul, despite increasing demands (both domestic and international) for reform.
In spite of this unpropitious environment, the IMF and the Indonesian government 
did reach their third agreement on April 9.94 The new agreement reiterated the points 
agreed in the earlier ones, and added some more—making a total of 117 specific 
requirements, including more specific targets and a time-table for implementation. 
However, even before the ink was dry on the agreement, Suharto implicitly dismissed 
what he had just signed, calling instead for an undefined "IMF plus" program. This 
time, having witnessed the show before, the markets failed to react to the agreement. 
However, the same could not be said of the growing popular opposition to Suharto 
rule. Following weeks of largely peaceful student demonstrations at dozens of 
universities across the country, events soon turned violent after a harsh crackdown by 
the security forces. The calls for Suharto's resignation grew louder following the 
government's ill-advised decision to increase fuel prices sharply (up 71 percent for 
gasoline and 25 percent for kerosene) in early May.95 Between May 13-17, 1998, the 
pent-up frustrations exploded. Widespread and violent rioting occurred 
simultaneously in many cities and towns throughout the country and, most tragically, 
in Jakarta, where over a thousand people were killed. Under intense domestic and 
international pressure, and in the face of mass demonstrations, Suharto abruptly 
resigned on May 21,1998 after thirty-two years as president. It marked the beginning 
of the end of the "New Order" regime.
In accordance with the constitution, vice-president B. J. Habibie was sworn in as 
president to serve out the remainder of Suharto's five-year term. Habibie inherited a 
nation in crisis. Lacking popular support and legitimacy, the regime watched helplessly 
as civil law and order collapsed and armed gangs arbitrarily targeted the symbols of 
the "New Order"—in particular, Sino-Indonesian businesses—engaging in looting and 
destruction with impunity. The wanton destruction of property and infrastructure 
severely disrupted economic activity, especially exports so critical to economic 
recovery. In the ensuing chaos, expatriates, businesses, and capital fled Indonesia; 
members of the IMF and World Bank delegation in Jakarta joined the exodus. Both 
during and immediately after the riots, there were massive runs on all banks, in 
particular, Bank Central Asia, the nation's largest private bank, accounting for 12 
percent of total banking sector liabilities. Bank Indonesia, in conjunction with two of 
the state banks, supplied over 30 trillion rupiah in cash to Bank Central Asia over the 
week following May 16 as deposits were withdrawn. Finally, on May 29, Bank Central 
Asia was brought under the auspices of IBRA, and the owners' rights suspended.96 In
94 IMF, "Indonesia: Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies," April 10,1998, 
(http:/ /www.imf.org/external/np/loi/041098.htm)
95 The fuel price increase (although not its precise timing) was one of the IMF conditions. It is not clear if 
the IMF wanted the measure to be implemented incrementally or at once. In any case, the Suharto government 
implemented the measure at once—severely impacting the vast majority of Indonesians.
96 Enoch, "Interventions in Banks."
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this climate of chaos and uncertainty, the rupiah fell below 12,000 to the dollar by the 
end of May and continued to nosedive, reaching Rp. 16,500 against the dollar on June 
17—a cumulative depreciation of 85 percent since June 1997.
In the face of growing social unrest and international pressure, President Habibie, 
in a surprise volte-face, accepted the charge that the New Order regime was 
undemocratic, promising now an Orde Reformasi (Reformation Order). To show his 
commitment, the Habibie government immediately freed the press from the draconian 
constraints that had been in force under Suharto and revoked the law that limited the 
number of political parties to two. Habibie also announced that new parliamentary 
elections (to be preceded by the rewriting of New Order election and political party 
laws) would be held in mid-1999. In the economic realm,
President Habibie and most of the new cabinet showed a greatly increased 
commitment to implementing the IMF program. Specifically, immediate pressure 
was off Bank Indonesia to do anything more than restore financial stability. 
There was significant easing of political pressures to bail out banks, and no 
apparent pressure on BI to reduce interest rates prematurely again."97
Moreover, Habibie affirmed that the Coordinating Minister for the Economy, Ginandjar 
Kartasasmita, the official most trusted by the IMF in the last days of Suharto's 
presidency, would remain in office-this despite a long history of political, policy, and 
personal conflict between Habibie and Ginandjar. Perhaps what pleased the IMF (not 
to mention a section of the Indonesian business community) most was Habibie's 
announcement that the University of Indonesia economics professor, Prof. Widjojo 
Nitisastro, would have an enhanced advisory role in the government.98 On June 24, the 
IMF and the Indonesian government signed the "Second Supplementary Memorandum 
of Economic and Financial policies"99—a revised version of the economic program 
signed on April 10. The new memorandum bleakly noted that "with the disruptions to 
economic activity and damage to business confidence in recent weeks, it is now 
expected that real GDP will decline by more than 10 percent in 1998."
Bad as this news was, there was more to come. In late June 1998, audit reports on 
banks that had been taken over by IBRA—reports that were conducted by 
international accounting firms during the spring and summer of 1998—were leaked to 
the press. The results were devastating, showing levels of nonperforming loans ranging 
from 55 percent to more than 90 percent of the banks' portfolios.100 For most of these 
banks, the loans' portfolios were dominated by memo-lending. By early August, the 
results of the portfolio reviews for a group of sixteen large banks, all of them non-IBRA 
(except for Bank Central Asia), became available. The results showed that the
97 Kenward, "What Has Been Happening," p. 124.
98 Professor Widjojo Nitisastro is considered the chief architect of the New Order development policy. He 
served as Suharto's chief economic adviser from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s. In later years he was 
frequently called upon to rescue the economy from the depredations caused by Suharto's children, and big 
spenders like Habibie and Ginandjar. Widjojo's commitment to market-oriented macroeconomic policies 
reassured both the IMF and sections of the Indonesian business community.
99 IMF, "Indonesia: Second Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies," June 24,
1998), (http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/062498.htm)
100 Enoch, "Interventions in Banks," p. 16.
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financial condition of these banks was also very weak. Given that many of these banks 
would have been expected to be among the strongest in the country, these reviews 
confirmed the deep insolvency of the banking system as a whole. The immediate 
consequence was shock that the state of the banks were so bad, but beyond that, the 
leak put an end to denial of the seriousness of the banking problems and forced the 
Indonesian authorities to recognize that implementation of banking reforms was of 
utmost urgency.
Towards Banking and Corporate Sector Reforms
The massive insolvency of the Indonesian banking system called for a major 
restructuring of the entire sector. In September 1998, Bank Indonesia outlined an 
ambitious multi-billion dollar bank recapitalization plan,101 and in October, the 
Indonesian parliament passed amendments to the banking law that modified previous 
requirements regarding bank secrecy and ended restrictions on foreign ownership of 
banks. These amendments also strengthened the legal powers of IBRA and AMU, 
enabling them to operate more effectively—for instance, to be able to transfer assets 
and to foreclose against a nonperforming debtor. To show that it was serious about 
implementing the plans, the government, in mid-September, announced that four state- 
owned banks (BDN, EXIM, BBD, and Bapindo), along with the corporate business of a 
fifth state bank (BRI), would be merged into a new institution, Bank Mandiri. Bank 
Mandiri was established on September 30 as the holder of 100 percent of the shares of 
the component banks.102 Moreover, efforts were made to strengthen the prudential and 
regulatory framework. Specifically, three new regulations in the area of loan 
classification, provisioning, and debt restructuring operations came into effect in late 
December 1998. In the area of liquidity management, banks were required to submit a 
liquidity report twice monthly for their global consolidated operations (this 
requirement became effective in early 1999). Among other things, the liquidity report 
had to contain both a foreign currency liquidity profile and a rupiah and foreign 
currency profile. Also, beginning in April 1999, banks were to be required to publish 
their financial statements quarterly. Last, by the end of 2000, banks would be required 
to comply with a minimum capital adequacy requirement of 8 percent.103
The more difficult challenge lies in the area of bank recapitalization. Keeping in 
mind that nonperforming loans are estimated at 60-85 percent of all loans, and that 
bank recapitalization costs are estimated at a staggering Rp. 643 trillion (about US$89 
billion), or 60 percent of GDP, we must recognize that it will likely take several years 
to restore the financial sector to health.104 The first major step towards
101 Under the recapitalization plan, for every rupiah of fresh capital injected into banks that qualified for 
recapitalization, the government would put up Rp. 4. In return for its injections of capital (which were to be 
refunded by bond issue) the government would receive equity stakes in the banks. Bank owners would then 
have three years to redeem part or the entire government stake.
102 Following the legal merger in July 1999, the government began plans to privatize Bank Mandiri and the 
three remaining state-owned banks.
103 Syahril Sabirin, "Recent Developments in the Indonesian Economy," presentation to Banque de France, 
March, 1999, Mimeo.
104 Lindgren, et al., "Financial Sector Crisis," p. 65.
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recapitalization of private banks began in early 1999. On the basis of a review carried 
out by independent auditors of all state banks, nationalized banks, regional banks and 
private banks, the Indonesian authorities ranked banks into three categories according 
to their capital adequacy ratio. Under the new ranking system, banks in category C 
(those with a capital adequacy ratio of less than negative 25 percent) were to face 
liquidation. By March 1999, thirty-eight banks, all deeply insolvent and with no hope 
of recovering, had been closed and "their owners will be required to repay their 
connected [i.e. memo] lending."105 Indeed, the government announced a list of the two 
hundred largest defaulting borrowers and began the process of actively collecting from 
the twenty largest defaulters. Nine Category B banks ( those with a ratio of negative 25 
percent to less than 4 percent) were deemed eligible for recapitalization, while seven 
category B banks were taken over by IBRA. These banks were in serious financial 
difficulty, although it was stated that, due to their extensive branch networks, they 
would be taken over (and not closed) to minimize disruption to the payments system. 
Former owners of these institutions were blocked from further roles in the management 
of banks. The intention was to restructure these banks, improve their financial 
performance, reduce their burden on the budget, and prepare them for privatization. 
All category A banks (those with a capital adequacy ratio of 4 percent or higher) were 
allowed to continue business. Seven private banks were recapitalized in 1999, and four 
state-owned banks, comprising half of the assets of the banking sector, were merged 
into one and recapitalized.
Cognizant of the fact that Indonesian taxpayers were providing the funds, 
authorities required that two criteria be met by banks seeking recapitalization. First, all 
banks were required to submit business plans that showed their viability over a three- 
year period, and their managers were required to pass tests ensuring that they were 
technically competent to run a bank. And second, since many of the banks eligible for 
recapitalization were owned by some of the country's major conglomerates, the 
existing shareholders were required to provide at least 20 percent (in cash) of the total 
funds necessary to restore the bank's capital adequacy ratio to 4 percent before IBRA 
would put in any funds. Overall, in the past two years, the Indonesian banking sector 
has been significantly consolidated. Since mid-1997, the number of private domestic 
banks has been nearly halved through closures or state takeovers. By the end of 1999, 
banks under state control held about 70 percent of liabilities, compared to 40 percent 
before the crisis.106 Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether recapitalization will 
result in a healthy banking sector.
As of mid-1999, the public contribution to financial sector restructuring has been 
equal to 51 percent of GDP. The largest share of this has been used to recapitalize 
banks and provide liquidity support.107 It is important to keep in mind that IBRA is 
financed by a mix of medium- and long-term government-guaranteed bonds, some 
inflation-indexed, others not. These bonds pay high rates of interest, averaging 14 
percent annually. IBRA has exchanged these bonds for the worst nonperforming loans 
in the banking system (the so-called Category 5 loans). In the process, IBRA has
105 Government of Indonesia, "Government of Indonesia Announces Sweeping Reforms to the Bank System," 
press release, 1999, (http://www.bi.go.id.Intl/press.html)
106 Lindgren, et al, "Financial Sector Crisis," p. 65.
107 Ibid.
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acquired billions of dollars worth of assets—measured at face value, not market 
value.108 While IBRA has been given substantial extrajudicial powers to deal with 
recalcitrant debtors, it remains to be seen what portion of the loans IBRA will be able 
to recover. So far the progress has been slow. Indeed, the implementation of the 
program came to an abrupt halt in August 1999 with the outbreak of the Bank Bali 
scandal. The scandal allegedly implicated senior officials at Bank Indonesia, the 
Ministry of Finance, and IBRA. These senior officials were accused of cooperating in a 
deal that arranged for a Habibie-connected company to pay US$80 million to a 
private bank, Bank Bali, in order to recover claims that were in fact already guaranteed 
by the government. This scandal led to the suspension of the IMF funds in September 
1999.
As noted earlier, the level of nonperforming loans in the Indonesian banking system 
is simply unprecedented. Since coming into operation, the AMU has taken over loans 
from a variety of institutions: closed banks, banks that have been taken over, state- 
owned banks, and banks participating in the recapitalization schemes. However, not 
all of these loans have been transferred. Moreover, because of its limited resources, 
IBRA has been unable to administer all of these loans on its own. In fact, bad loans of 
less than five billion rupiah are handled by the individual banks, bad loans valued at 
between five billion and twenty-five billion rupiah are subcontracted back to the 
individual banks (implementation remains under the supervision of the AMU), and 
bad loans in excess of twenty-five billion rupiah are handled directly by the AMU. In 
addition to loans, some non-core assets, including automobiles and office equipment, 
have been transferred to the AMU. According to the Indonesian government, the total 
amount of problem debt transferred to the AMU as of January 2000 was 
approximately 250 trillion rupiah.109
By year-end 1997, domestic private corporations had borrowed US$53.6 billion 
from foreign banks, which left the corporate sector (as well as Indonesian banks 
exposed to these corporates) highly vulnerable to sudden depreciation. By late 1998, 
of the estimated US$118 billion corporate debt, nearly 60 percent was owed to foreign 
creditors and about half of the remaining 40 percent was denominated in foreign 
currency. This, in effect, rendered the Indonesian corporate sector systematically 
vulnerable to large-scale depreciation of the rupiah.110 Indeed, the widespread rupiah 
depreciation that took place during the height of the crisis drove almost half of 
Indonesian corporations into insolvency and caused many more corporations 
difficulties in meeting their debt-servicing obligations.
108 According to Hufbauer, as of August 1999, IBRA had acquired some Rp. 500 trillion (US$85 billion) of 
assets, measured at face value, not market value. Gary Hufbauer, "Cleaning Up the Financial Wreckage: An 
Eight-Point Program for Indonesia," Policy Paper (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics,
1999).
109 For details, see Gregory Root, Paul Grela, Mark Jones, and Anand Adiga, "Financial Sector 
Restructuring in East Asia," in Managing Financial and Corporate Distress: Lessons from Asia, ed. Charles 
Adams, Robert Litan, and Michael Pomerleano (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 
pp. 192-3.
110 Masahiro Kawai, Ira Lieberman, and William Mako, "Financial Stabilization and Initial 
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(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 82.
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The Indonesian government's strategy for corporate restructuring has included three 
elements. First, the Jakarta Initiative and the Jakarta Initiative Task Force (JITF) were 
introduced in September 1998 to facilitate voluntary negotiations between debtors and 
creditors for corporate restructuring and to provide a regulatory "one-stop shop" for 
administrative procedures pertaining to debt resolution. The Jakarta Initiative 
introduced a set of principles based on the London Approach to guide voluntary out- 
of-court corporate restructuring.111 The JITF was intended to facilitate negotiations 
between debtors and creditors and to obtain necessary regulatory approvals for deals. 
As of April 2000, while 320 companies with US$23 billion in debts have registered 
with the JITF, only six cases (totaling less than US$1 billion in debt) have been 
resolved. Poor enforcement of laws to protect creditors has given debtors little 
incentive to agree to restructuring deals likely to result in debt-to-equity conversions 
and substantial dilution of their shareholdings.112 Second, a new bankruptcy system 
and a special commercial court were introduced to provide a credible threat. Third, the 
Indonesian Debt Restructuring Agency (INDRA) was established under the Frankfurt 
Agreement in June 1998 to provide foreign exchange cover for Indonesian corporations 
with foreign currency-denominated debt once they have reached debt restructuring 
agreements. Despite these initiatives, corporate debt restructuring has proceeded 
slowly. Implementation of the bankruptcy law must be improved if the process is to be 
more successful. Specifically, voluntary mechanisms for restructuring corporate debt 
will have greater appeal if creditors can reasonably expect to be able to speedily 
enforce their claims against debtors through legal means, should voluntary methods 
fail.
Democracy and Reforms
On June 7,1999, Indonesia held a democratic election for the first time since 1955. 
Forty-eight political parties competed, with twenty-one winning at least one of the 462 
contested seats in the five-hundred-member national Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or 
parliament (the additional thirty-eight seats are held by appointed armed forces 
delegates). Simultaneous elections were held for legislatures in twenty-six provinces 
and more than three hundred districts and municipalities. Over 90 percent of 
registered voters turned out for the three-level elections.113 At the national level, the 
PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan) won 34 percent of the vote and 153 
seats in parliament; Golkar (Golongan Karya) won 22 percent of the vote and 120 
seats; the PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa) won 12 percent of the votes and 51 seats; 
PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) won 10 percent of the votes and 58 seats; and
111 The London Approach, formulated by the Bank of England in the 1970s and developed further in the 
1990s, consists of a set of non-binding principles to guide debt restructuring processes. It has three 
objectives: to minimize losses to creditors and other parties; to avoid unnecessary liquidations of 
fundamentally viable debtors; and to ensure continued financial support to viable debtors.
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113 At that time, East Timor was still the twenty-seventh province, but did not participate in the elections. 
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PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional) won 7 percent of the votes and 34 seats.114 On 
October 20, 1999, the seven-hundred-member Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat 
(People's Consultative Assembly) met to elect a new president and vice-president to 
govern the world's fourth-most-populous nation for the next five years. The 
presidential election was won by long-time democratic activist and PKB leader, 
Abdurrahman Wahid (also fondly known as Gus Dur), who won 373 votes against 
PDI-P's Megawati Sukarnoputri with 313. On October 21, Megawati was elected by an 
overwhelming majority as vice-president.
The new government committed itself to the rapid implementation of the economic 
reform measures, and immediately after the October elections, it signed a new letter of 
intent with the IMF. However, policy-making in a deeply fragmented parliament with 
its competing parties and factions has not been easy. Moreover, President Wahid's 
well-intentioned decision to form a "national unity cabinet" created its own 
problems.115 In the economic arena, fragmentation of the cabinet was reflected in the 
fragmentation of economic decision-making authority between a number of competing 
cabinet ministers and their outside advisers. This delayed the implementation of 
reforms—in particular, corporate debt restructuring—culminating in the embarrassing 
suspension of US$400 million in IMF support in late March 2000.116 However, the IMF 
action seemed to act as a wake-up call. Since that action, the Wahid administration 
has made concerted efforts to implement economic reforms, including addressing the 
problem of corruption and the Suharto family wealth.
To compensate for the problems associated with the Bank Bali scandal and to 
renew its commitment to reforms, the Wahid government, gave IBRA extraordinary 
powers (the so-called PP17 powers), effective October 1999, to seize assets of 
uncooperative debtors. IBRA used its PP17 powers for the first time in December 
1999, seizing two properties, including fourteen hectares of land in Jakarta from a firm 
owned by a Suharto family member. Similarly, in an effort to energize the JITF, the 
government has approved time-bound procedures for JITF mediation of its cases and 
agreed that the JITF may refer cases of uncooperative debtors to the government's 
Financial Sector Policy Committee for action by the attorney general's office in 
Bankruptcy Court. Also, the government has made concerted efforts to address the 
negative perceptions about governance in judicial processes. There is the realization 
that delays in corporate debt restructuring will impede economic recovery. Finally, 
while Indonesia undoubtedly faces daunting challenges to reforming its banking and 
financial sector, the realization that a weak banking sector made Indonesia particularly 
vulnerable to the Asian economic crisis, and deepened the depth and duration of the 
crisis, is strong incentive to move forward with the reforms.
114 Two other parties with significant support were PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang) and PK (Partai Keadilan), 
which won 2 percent and thirteen seats and 1 percent and six seats, respectively. See Liddle, "Indonesia in 
1999," p. 33.
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1 ^  The IMF delayed its disbursement because it found that Indonesia had made almost no progress on the 
promises it made in January 2000.
